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Abstract
The language of “resilience” features prominently in contemporary climate security debates.
While a basic definition of resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb recurrent distur-
bances so as to retain its essential structures, processes, and feedbacks, I argue that resilience
is currently articulated in four distinct ways in climate security discourse. These are strategic
resilience, neoliberal resilience, social resilience, and ecological resilience. Most analyses of
resilience-based security discourses have hitherto been informed by Foucauldian notions
of governing populations at a distance to ensure compliance with neoliberal norms. How-
ever, in the climate security field, neoliberal resilience discourses have achieved relatively
little salience, while Foucauldian accounts are largely overdetermined, thus obscuring the
multiple ways in which resilience is currently articulated. In this article, I identify these dis-
parate resilience discourses through an analysis of recent US and UK government, interna-
tional organization, nongovernmental organization, and academic climate security
literature. I then analyze these discourses in terms of their basic discursive structure and
degree of institutionalization to clarify how dominant climate security narratives construct
understandings of security and insecurity in contemporary global environmental politics.
While strategic articulations are currently most conspicuous, I argue that only social and
ecological resilience support long-term human flourishing and ecosystem integrity.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation actions are increasingly justified in
terms of security imperatives (see, e.g., CNA Corporation 2014; Obama 2015;
UK Ministry of Defence 2008, 2010; US Department of Defense 2012, 2014b).
While there is disagreement about whether climate change and other environ-
mental problems will create new “conflict constellations” (German Advisory
Council on Global Change 2007) or merely exacerbate existing insecurities by
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acting as a “threat multiplier” (Center for Climate and Security 2015), there is
general consensus that climate change has the potential to increase the vulner-
ability of individuals, communities and states, and the stability of the entire
international system. One frequently touted remedy for these insecurities is
resilience, which some argue has lately replaced both stability as the predomi-
nant trope within security discourses (Zebrowski 2016) and sustainable devel-
opment as the focus of social–ecological discourses (Frankenberger et al. 2014).
The genealogy of resilience as a security value can be traced to British
emergency governance in the interwar years and to fostering preparedness for
thermonuclear war in the immediate postwar period. However, it was not until
the early 1970s that the concept was consolidated into an emergent form of se-
curity governance (Zebrowski 2016). Since then, resilience has appeared in
many fields, including engineering, ecology, computing, psychology, and eco-
nomics, to denote “the capacity of an entity or system to withstand shocks,
recover, adapt, or in some cases learn, evolve, or move to a new systemic equi-
librium while maintaining basic functions” (Corry 2014, 257). However, be-
yond this general characterization, resilience is articulated in a multiplicity of
ways, both across distinct issue areas and even within specific fields, as has oc-
curred vis-à-vis climate security (Boas and Rothe 2016; Brown 2013; Walker and
Cooper 2011; Zebrowski 2016, 148).
While some welcome resilience’s conceptual vagueness for its potential to
integrate diverse actors and understandings toward commonly agreed security
objectives (Zebrowski 2016), others warn that “resilience” has become an ill-
defined boundary object liable to be co-opted by widely divergent interests,
actors, and contexts (Gillard 2016; Joseph 2013). In this article, I clarify the dis-
parate meanings of resilience within contemporary climate security discourses to
better understand how these tropes construct conceptualizations of security and
insecurity. By extending upon previous surveys of the field, which have hitherto
underexamined the emergence of resilience-inflected climate security discourses
(see, e.g., Dalby 2013; Eckersley 2009; Elliott 2015; Floyd and Matthew 2013;
Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014; McDonald 2013; Trombetta 2008), my analysis
deepens understandings of how dominant climate security narratives shape per-
ceptions of climatic risks, responsibility for harm and remediation, and the basic
contours of discursive power in contemporary global environmental politics.
In security studies, resilience is most readily analyzed in terms of its role
“in reproducing and disseminating neoliberalism … [by] controlling ‘life’ or
populations” (Corry 2014, 258; see also Grove 2012; Joseph 2013; Walker
and Cooper 2011; Welsh 2014; Zebrowski 2016). From this Foucauldian per-
spective, power is understood to be exercised not directly by means of coercion,
but through the governing of populations via economistic regimes of knowl-
edge. However, although these models are instructive, in climate security dis-
course, they obscure other possible articulations of resilience, including
within non-neoliberal forms of governmentality and/or as a means to subvert
traditional realist security logics (Corry 2014). It is necessary, therefore, to place
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the standard Foucauldian account in the context of other key existing/emergent
articulations of resilience, with specific reference to contemporary climate secu-
rity discourses. In the climate security field, neoliberal articulations of resilience
coexist with strategic, social, and ecological frames. By drawing on case study
material from the United States, Britain, key international and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), and relevant academic literature, I outline these four
discourses in this article.
This analysis is distinguished from several previous studies of resilience
discourse, including Methmann and Oels (2015, 54), who extend Holling’s
(1973) typology of “engineering resilience” (resilience as system maintenance)
and “ecological resilience” (resilience as system adaptation) to include “socio-
ecological resilience,” in which emergent systems “manage themselves and even
develop new and improved properties.” Another approach is provided by Welsh
(2014), who distinguishes between “psycho-social resilience” (the resilience of
individuals and communities), “socioecological resilience” (the capacity of a
system to return to a state of equilibrium), and resilience as neoliberal govern-
mentality. Meanwhile, Cavelty et al. (2015) classify resilience discourses in
terms of their temporalities (whether the discourse relates to past or potential
future disruptive events) and how the discourse distributes responsibilities and
risks. Finally, Bourbeau (2013) identifies three distinct forms of resilience: “re-
silience as maintenance” (adaptation to maintain the status quo), “resilience as
marginality” (reforms at the margins but not fundamental policy changes), and
“resilience as renewal” (changes to fundamental policy assumptions and even
the transformation of underlying social structures).
In the first section of this article, I develop a framework for identifying,
categorizing, and comparing resilience discourses in terms of their respective ref-
erent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points, forms and rationalities of gover-
nance, social–ecological–technological transitional pathways, level of formal
authority, and degree of institutionalization. Using this framework, I then eluci-
date the four main resilience discourses within contemporary climate security
debates and evaluate their political salience. I conclude by reflecting on the limits
of discourse analysis in climate security studies, and I identify future opportunities
for improving understandings of actually existing resilience practices.
Climate Security and Resilience: A Framework for Analysis
While many of the existing taxonomic schemes noted above are instructive, the
typology I develop in this article differs from these in three key ways. First, it is
concerned specifically with resilience as it is articulated within climate security
discourse. This necessitated a close reading of key texts articulating “the climate”
as an object of security discourse and “resilience” as a security strategy to reduce
vulnerability to climatic risks. My objective was to identify the set of basic dis-
courses that delineate the key understandings and representations that structure
agreement and disagreement within the climate security debate rather than
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merely to determine the most frequently articulated discourses, or those dis-
courses enunciated by the most powerful actors. For this reason, neither the
number of texts consulted nor the number of discourses identified was pre-
determined (Hansen 2006). The texts selected were all published since 2007,
which is widely understood as the year in which climate security discourse first
attained salience (Dalby 2013; McDonald 2013; Oels 2012; Trombetta 2008).
Following Hansen (2006), the chosen texts also exhibit one or more of the
following characteristics: they clearly articulate a referent object and related
identities and policy responses, are generated at a “high level” with the formal
authority to define a political position, and/or are widely read and attended to,
thereby signaling a reasonable degree of political significance. I rated the level of
formal authority of each group of texts on a spectrum of very high, high, moderate,
low, and very low, based on whether the texts were produced by states, interna-
tional institutions, international NGOs, and academics/activists, respectively.
The same scale was used to measure the level of attention received by each body
of texts, using the number of records returned from searches of the Factiva
database as a proxy. These results are presented in full in the Appendix. Records
of 400 or greater were ranked as very high, 300–399 as high, 200–299 as moder-
ate, 100–199 as low, and 99 or less as very low. While it is impossible simply to
equate the level of attention a discourse receives with the political power it pos-
sesses, it may often be the case that citizens do adopt whichever tropes they hear
most frequently and/or most recently (Druckman 1999). More fundamentally,
the prominence of a discourse reflects the extent to which it has achieved insti-
tutionalization, whereby rules, norms, and ideas become unquestioned and/or
simply “common sense” (Korkut et al. 2016), which in many ways is “the ulti-
mate act of political power” (Smith 1996, 13).
The second analytical innovation I make is to categorize resilience dis-
courses in the first instance in terms of the referent object or objects of security
they articulate. While identifying referent objects is commonly used in security
studies, previous categorizations of resilience discourse have more frequently
focused on modes of governmentality or temporalities (e.g., Cavelty et al.
2015; Welsh 2014). The referent object/s of a particular security discourse are
those entities ‘that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legit-
imate claim to survival’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). Traditionally, the referents of
security have been understood as largely singular, static, and/or homogenous
entities, such as “the state” or “the nation” (Oels 2012; Trombetta 2011). How-
ever, this singularity is untenable in the context of the increasingly intercon-
nected, unpredictable, and uncontrollable Earth system occasioned by the
Anthropocene (Grove and Chandler 2017), which is the new geological epoch
into which the Earth has entered as a consequence of humans immeasurably
changing global geochemical processes since the middle of last century
(Steffen et al. 2015). For, as Harrington and Shearing (2017, 111; see also
Fagan, 2017; McDonald 2018) point out, “holding any object or level to be
the singular object of security misrepresents the layered folds of existence in
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the Anthropocene, … [and] fundamentally misreads how creative, ‘intra-acting’
forces constitute our worlds.” This also underlines the futility of distinguishing
referent objects from the biogeochemical processes through which they are con-
stituted. Therefore, to retain its utility as a category of analysis, the referent/s of
security must be understood not simply as discrete entities, such as states and
communities, but as potentially systemic in the sense of “socioecological
systems” or “ecosystems,” for example. Analyzing resilience discourses as to
whether they conceive of the referent/s of security as systemic or merely discrete
is the third key analytical innovation of this article.
Five further elements are required to analyze the articulation of resilience
within climate security discourses. First, both threats and referent objects are
articulated by securitizing actors, such as political leaders, governments, interna-
tional organizations, bureaucracies, lobbyists, activists, and communities. Gen-
erally, these actors do not depict themselves as the referent objects of security
discourse; rather, they emphasize the need to defend the security of the state,
nation, civilization, environment, or some other existentially threatened entity
(Buzan et al. 1998).
Second, all discourses are constructed from a set of key rhetorical devices
or nodal points, which are the privileged or dominant forms of speech that fix the
meaning of a particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). For example, in
realist parlance, the description of the international system as “anarchical” is
a nodal point that articulates a Hobbesian world order. Similarly, the notion
of a “rules-based system” is a nodal point in neoliberal institutionalism, which
implies that states can profitably cooperate toward common objectives.
Third, security discourses display different forms of governance that organize
governing structures, of which Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify three
basic types: “hierarchies,” “markets,” and “networks.” Hierarchical forms of gov-
ernance operate through administrative orders and rules, which are developed
and implemented by governments and bureaucracies; markets function as a
form of ostensibly self-organizing economic governance; while networks are re-
source, economic, political, informational, and interpersonal dependencies
built on communication, trust, and cooperation.
Fourth are the rationalities of governance that shape actors’ behavior and
expectations. Again, Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify three distinct
approaches: “administrative,” “market,” and “deliberative.” In an adminis-
trative framework, bureaucrats and experts work to solve complex problems
and implement solutions through laws and regulations, whereas market
rationality relies on price mechanisms, contracts, and the assumption of
economically rational actor behavior. Deliberative rationality, meanwhile,
opens decision-making processes to those individuals and groups most im-
pacted by particular issue areas and seeks policy solutions that all affected
parties can accept.
Finally, all resilience discourses articulate a particular social–ecological–
technological transitional pathway in response to global environmental and
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socioeconomic change (Leach et al. 2010). While the range of possible posi-
tions on this question is vast, in contemporary climate security discourse, the
most prominent perspectives can be captured by a broad juxtaposition be-
tween ecomodernist discourses at the most technologically optimistic end of
the spectrum and postgrowth/postdevelopment perspectives at the most techno-
logically skeptical (Grunwald 2018). Ecomodernists envisage the “radical de-
coupling of humans from nature” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, 18) via urban,
industrial, and agricultural intensification and high-energy technologies. Eco-
nomic growth and technological innovation are assumed to face no biophys-
ical limits, and all environmental and social problems are believed to be
technologically resolvable without generating any significant unintended
consequences. Postgrowth/postdevelopment transitional pathways, in con-
trast, reject the assertion that technology can solve most ecological problems
and that economic growth faces no biophysical limits. Instead of growing the
world into prosperity, reductions in consumption in the Global North are
proposed to ensure that the social and ecological costs of economic activity
do not exceed its benefits and to create ecological space for improved living
standards in the South (Ferguson 2015; Isenhour 2016). Whereas ecomo-
dernism prescribes technocratic forms of governance, postgrowth/post-
development discourses facilitate participatory/deliberative policy-making
processes (Cosme et al. 2017) that challenge dominant neoliberal develop-
ment models (Escobar 2012).
Four Discourses of Resilience
In the remainder of this article, I use this analytical framework to outline the
four main articulations of resilience in contemporary climate security discourse
in terms of their respective referent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points,
forms and rationalities of governance, and social–ecological–technological tran-
sitional pathways. I also evaluate each discourse as to the clarity of its referent
object/s, level of formal authority, and degree of institutionalization.
Strategic Resilience
Mainstream security actors have adopted a largely traditional national secu-
rity framing of resilience, involving military responses to natural disasters,
relating climatic risks to security planning and critical infrastructure pro-
tection, and resisting significant geopolitical rebalancing (Brown 2013).
This exhibits a narrowly strategic understanding of resilience, which is artic-
ulated in key national and climate security strategies released by the US
Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS), the White
House, the UK Ministry of Defence, and relevant reports from defense think
tanks.
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In the United States, strategic resilience was first articulated following the
formation of the DHS in 2002. The department’s National Strategy for Homeland
Security declared that
[We] must now focus on the resilience of the system as a whole—an
approach that centres on investments that make the system better able to
absorb the impact of an event without losing the capacity to function. While
this might include the building of redundant assets, resilience often is
attained through the dispersal of key functions across multiple service
providers and flexible supply chains and related systems. Resilience also in-
cludes the protection and physical survivability of key national assets and
structures (US Department of Homeland Security 2007, 28).
While the 2007 strategy did not explicitly acknowledge climate security
risks, it precipitated the subsequent adoption of resilience language into the cli-
mate risk and threat analysis frameworks of key US security agencies, leading to
the “mainstreaming” of climate change as an issue of strategic importance
(Thomas 2013). A catalyst for this securitization of climate change was Presi-
dent Obama’s (2009) Executive Order 13514, which requires all federal de-
partments, including the DoD, to reduce operational and nonoperational
greenhouse gas emissions by 34 percent from 2008 levels by 2020, evaluate
risks posed by climate change, produce an annual environmental sustainability
plan, and develop a climate change adaptation strategy. Climate security consid-
erations also featured prominently in the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strat-
egies (Obama 2010, 2015) and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, which
proposed a range of “actions to increase energy and water security, including
investments in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy
sources, [to] increase the resiliency of [defense] installations and help mitigate
[climate change] effects” (US Department of Defense 2014b, vi). Meanwhile, in
2013, President Obama established a Task Force on Climate Preparedness and
Resilience “to advise the Administration on how the Federal Government can
respond to the needs of communities nationwide that are dealing with the
impacts of climate change” (Obama 2013). Since 2012, the DoD (2012,
2014a) has also published two Climate Change Adaptation Roadmaps. The 2014
Roadmap calls “for sustainable use of natural resources to support mission
needs, meet stewardship requirements, and contribute to ecosystem resilience
in the face of climate change” (12) and requires defense agencies to “contribute
to coordinated inter-agency efforts to support climate preparedness and resil-
ience at all levels of government” (15).
Climate change considerations and the language of resilience have also
been incorporated into recent security strategy documents in the United Kingdom
(see, e.g., Strategic Trends Programme 2014; UK Ministry of Defence 2008, 2010).
Contrary to the largely pre-emptive American articulations of resilience, British
discourse exhibits a more precautionary approach, which shifts security framings
from traditional friend–enemy binaries to a risk prevention and management
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logic, emphasizing complexity, preparedness, and decentralization (Boas and
Rothe 2016; Walker and Cooper 2011). For instance, the Home Office (cited
in Zebrowski 2016, 107) defines resilience as the ability “at every relevant
level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disrup-
tive challenges.” Similarly, the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic
Defence and Security Review promised to “increase … finance for developing
countries … to reduce emissions, increase access to energy, [and] build resil-
ience of the poorest and most vulnerable people” (UK Ministry of Defence
2015, 70). While the UK military has not adopted emissions reductions tar-
gets and energy efficiency measures comparable to those the United States
has implemented, Britain’s overall climate security strategy is better integrated
into its national climate policy framework. This is reflected in the United
Kingdom’s commitment to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by 50 per-
cent by 2025 from 1990 levels, compared to the US commitment of a 26–28
percent cut by 2025 from 2005 levels (UK Committee on Climate Change 2017;
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2016), which the
Trump (2017) administration does not intend to honor. The United Kingdom
has also been a persistent proponent of strong emissions reductions within
international climate negotiations and has attempted to securitize climate
change to stimulate multilateral action to reduce emissions, including instigat-
ing the first ever debate on climate change in the United Nations Security Coun-
cil in 2007 (Harris 2012).
Despite these differences of emphasis, by adopting the state as their pri-
mary referent object and the maintenance of the geopolitical status quo as the
overall security objective, both the US and UK resilience discourses sit comfort-
ably within traditional national security frameworks. The main securitizing
actors are national military establishments and senior defense policy makers,
thereby according strategic resilience a very high level of formal authority. Stra-
tegic resilience has also attained a very high degree of institutionalization, with
many of the discourse’s key texts being very highly read and attended to. A clear
and discrete referent object, the nation-state, is articulated, as are a set of nodal
points, such as “whole of government” strategies to secure “critical infrastruc-
ture,” which equate climate adaptation with maintaining operational resilience
in the face of existential threats.
Although some attention is paid to information networks, strategic resil-
ience is primarily shaped by hierarchical forms of governance and administra-
tive rationality, while the envisaged social–ecological–technological transitional
pathway is a technocratic form of ecomodernism. Although this recognizes the
enormity of global environmental problems, mitigating these risks is assumed
to be a technological and administrative challenge best addressed by state
security operatives and bureaucracies rather than a broader re-evaluation of
socioeconomic and strategic objectives. The fundamental purpose of strategic re-
silience, therefore, is to uphold traditional national security values, such as abso-
lute sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of increasingly nontraditional
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threats emanating from nonstate actors and global environmental and demo-
graphic change.
Neoliberal Resilience
When the focus is shifted from traditional strategic security discourses to the
governing of populations in the name of security, the referent object of resil-
ience discourse also changes. From this perspective, the security of critical infra-
structure and systems is not to be found merely in the resilience of these systems
in and of themselves, or even in the territorial defense of the nation-state, but in
the resilience of individual human beings and communities. In theory, resil-
ience as governmentality could serve various security objectives (Dean 2009).
However, in practice, it has most readily shaped patterns of thought and behav-
ior that sustain neoliberal socioeconomic norms and structures. Importantly,
this is not necessarily in order to protect individuals and communities directly
from harm but to preserve the conditions for the perpetuation of neoliberal cap-
italism by constructing citizen-subjects as “entrepreneurs and consumers” who
are “adapted to the inherent insecurities of market life” (Corry 2014, 259).
While the publics of Western nations are frequently governed in this man-
ner, the articulation of neoliberal resilience in climate security discourse has
most readily been directed toward vulnerable states and their citizens, where
it has sought to imbue subjects with the requisite characteristics to be resilient
in the face of global socioeconomic and climatic instability (Grove and
Chandler 2017; Joseph 2013). For both vulnerable states and individuals, resil-
ience is articulated as indispensable for survival in volatile global market and
climatic systems (Joseph 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011), where the state takes
little responsibility for the life chances of its citizens, irrespective of how these
are circumscribed by limited educational opportunities, poor health, or prevail-
ing socioeconomic structures (Brown 2005; Dean 2009). In this way, resilience,
as Zebrowski (2016, 3) observes, “offer[s] a way out of the age-old liberal prob-
lematic which pits freedom against security … by … harness[ing] the inherent
resilience of vital systems to self-organise responses in a bottom-up fashion,
rather than impos[ing] order in a top-down fashion.” This is in contrast to stra-
tegic resilience, which pursues security hierarchically by attempting to mitigate
direct threats to its referent.
The main neoliberal securitizing actors are international financial and
development institutions, led by the World Bank, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), and the World Resources Institute, which over the
last four decades have been prime conduits of the neoliberal Washington con-
sensus (Babb and Kentikelenis 2017; Bernstein 2001). In the climate security
field, much of this literature is built around the concept of “climate-resilient
development,” which the World Bank (2013) defines as a “set of institutional
arrangements, processes and instruments that help identify the risks from disas-
ters, climate extremes, gradual long-term climatic changes, and their associated
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impacts, and the design of measures” (viii) to “help the poor become more
resilient” (3).
One recommended means to make the poor more resilient is the “scaling
up” of ecosystem-based enterprises to increase productivity (World Resources
Institute 2008), which may increase resilience if ecosystems are not further com-
promised and vulnerability is not exacerbated by economic restructuring. How-
ever, expanding ecosystem-based enterprises might also leave communities
more vulnerable through greater exposure to global commodity and financial
markets and/or ecosystem degradation (Adger 2000; Dalby 2013). Another neo-
liberal resilience strategy is the sharing of data and establishing networks to as-
sist in planning for environmental disasters (World Bank 2013). Again, if these
networks assist vulnerable entities to build capacity to deal with risks, then, all
else being equal, vulnerability should be reduced. However, imploring vulner-
able states, communities, and households to be resilient in the face of risks they
did not produce and have limited capacity to manage or ameliorate is charac-
teristic of broader patterns of neoliberal risk distribution, which increase the
exposure of the most vulnerable while enhancing the adaptive capacity of
the most privileged (Joseph 2013; Welsh 2014; Zebrowski 2016).
The main risk mitigation stratagem of neoliberal resilience is “financializa-
tion,” involving the transformation of environmental insecurities into financial
instruments, such as insurance, weather derivatives, and catastrophe bonds to
hedge against environmental disasters (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme 2014; World Bank 2013). If these instruments increase the ability of
individuals and communities to manage risks and recover from disasters, then
they may alleviate vulnerability. The problem is, however, that these measures
are often not accessible to the most vulnerable people, who are generally too
poor to purchase simple insurance, let alone more sophisticated financial instru-
ments (Dalby 2013).
Financialization, therefore, constitutes the privatization of responsibility
for managing and ameliorating risk rather than decisive action to reduce existing
or future risks for vulnerable populations (Corry 2014; Grove 2012). This is
characteristic of economic forms and rationalities of governance that utilize
markets and information networks to instill neoliberal modes of resilience in
vulnerable states, communities, and individuals, in both inducing and punitive
ways. An example of the former is the World Bank’s (2013, 12) call for in-
centives “to progressively reward countries and communities that take positive
action towards climate and disaster resilient development.” Concessional loans
for infrastructure improvements, implementation of prescribed disaster re-
sponse systems, and access to insurance are examples of such inducements.
The World Bank (2013) also admonishes governments to “allow institutional
structures to mature and transcend political cycles” (15) and to reorganize
bureaucracies “to shield programmes from political change” (16). Depoliticiza-
tion and bureaucratic reorganization are well-trodden methods of embedding
neoliberal rationalities into state structures and policy outcomes (Brown
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2005). However, resilience discourses intensify this dynamic by applying eco-
logical motifs of complex adaptive systems, which depict the neoliberal order
as “natural” and immutable, thereby neutralizing critical inquiry into its conse-
quences (Brown 2012; MacKinnon and Derickson 2013; Walker and Cooper
2011). Punitively, the World Bank’s (2013, 31) lending criteria have become
increasingly conditional on recipient countries implementing prescribed resil-
ience measures, so that to receive assistance in the wake of natural disasters, bor-
rowers must demonstrate “that they have engaged in a comprehensive disaster
management program” and that they are sufficiently insured.
Although neoliberal resilience enjoys a high level of formal authority, it is
significantly less resonant than strategic or even ecological articulations in the
wider climate security discourse, achieving only a very low level of attention and
institutionalization. This may be because its referent object is generally less
clearly articulated than in other resilience discourses. For while neoliberal resil-
ience might appear to be concerned about vulnerable states and their citizens, it
is actually “development itself—the process of wealth generation—which is
being made more resilient to the impacts of climate change” (Brown 2012, 45).
Consequently, several analysts have argued that neoliberal articulations of resil-
ience are primarily concerned with protecting “business as usual,” “defending
the status quo,” opening “a new profit frontier” in climate change adaptation,
and prescribing a mechanism to facilitate continued economic growth (Brown
2012; Welsh 2014). Indeed, these ecomodernist assumptions and objectives are
made explicit by the World Bank (2013), which warns that “weather-related
events … can slam the brakes on economic growth and cripple markets” (v)
and that “economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty and is at the heart
of increasing resilience to climate change in poor countries” (7).
The key nodal points in neoliberal resilience discourse are “climate-resilient
development,” “risk management,” and “individual responsibility.” Although the
discourse is avidly ecomodernist in its envisaged social–ecological–technological
transitional pathway, it is less technocratic than strategic resilience and adopts an
economic rationality of governance that supports market-led processes of techno-
logical development and risk management. Overall, the basic purpose of neolib-
eral resilience discourse is the preservation of the global neoliberal system
through the inculcation of vulnerable states and their citizens to mitigate their
vulnerability through market processes, while making few claims on the resources
of more privileged entities, such as wealthy countries and transnational corpora-
tions. Although, at a discrete level, vulnerable states and communities are the pri-
mary referents of the discourse, it is actually the neoliberal socioeconomic status
quo that constitutes the fundamental, systemic referent of the discourse.
Social Resilience
The third articulation of resilience found in climate security discourse is social
resilience. Outside of academia, the main securitizing actors of this discourse
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comprise a small number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, in-
cluding some United Nations agencies and Oxfam, and social movements such
as the Transition Towns and voluntary simplicity/degrowth movements.
Social resilience is commonly defined as “the ability of communities to
withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure” (Adger 2000, 361). It
therefore adopts communities as its referent object and is strongly correlated with
the collective “capacity” and “agency” of communities to alleviate fundamental
vulnerabilities stemming from resource dependency and global environmental,
social, and economic change (Adger 2000; Brown 2013). Although, in the neo-
liberal era, the state has significantly abdicated responsibility for alleviating vul-
nerability to individuals and communities via resilience discourses, resilience
does have the capacity to enhance individual and community autonomy. This
emergent “postdevelopment” (Escobar 2012) or “postliberal resilience” para-
digm “puts the agency of those most in need of assistance at [its] centre, stres-
sing a programme of empowerment and capacity building” (Chandler 2012,
216).
Social resilience eschews strategic rationality and metaphors of conflict
and violence by adopting a human security framework (Brown 2013), which
prioritizes the security needs of people and communities, first and foremost
“freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” (United Nations Development
Programme 1994). Moreover, when human security is understood in terms of
resilience, security stems less from merely stabilizing systems to enhancing the
capacity for system transformation. Transformation is more far-reaching than mere
adaptation (Brown 2013), because whereas adaptability refers to the ability to
build resilience through collective action, “transformability is the capacity of
people to create a fundamentally new social-ecological system when ecological,
political, social, or economic conditions make the existing system untenable”
(Folke 2006, 260).
Social resilience is characterized by the UN Secretary General’s High-Level
Panel on Global Sustainability’s (2012, 6) Resilient People, Resilient Planet report
as “the scaling up [of] humanitarian capacities to deal with increasing environ-
mental stress and potential shocks, … [involving] precautionary strategies to
prevent adverse impacts on social and natural systems.” Meanwhile, a NGO ex-
emplar of social resilience is Oxfam’s (2009) People-Centred Resilience report,
which defines resilience in terms of restoring and diversifying natural resources
for sustainability, creating responsive institutions grounded in local contexts,
and expanding and improving sustainable livelihood options and in terms of
gender equality and participatory decision-making. Oxfam (2012, 15) has also
defined resilience in terms of ensuring “a safe and just space for humanity to
thrive in,” where planetary boundaries are not breached and a set of social
benchmarks, including access to health care, food, water, energy, education, em-
ployment, income, political participation, social equity, and gender equality, is
achieved. Activists have also articulated social resilience discourses, including
the Transition Towns movement, which seeks to build resilience in the face of
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Table 1
Resilience Discourses in the Climate Security Debate ▴
▴
▴
Resilience
Discourse
Referent Object/s
Discrete or
Systemic Securitizing Actor/s Key Literature
Clear
Articulation
of Referent/s
Level of
Formal
Authority
Strategic
resilience
The nation-
state (discrete)
US and UK military
establishment,
senior defence
policy makers,
strategic think
tanks
US Department of
Defense (2012, 2014b,
2014a); US Department
of Homeland Security
(2007); Obama (2010,
2013, 2015); UK
Ministry of Defence
(2008, 2010, 2015);
Strategic Trends
Programme (2014); CNA
Corporation (2014);
German Advisory
Council on Global
Change (2007)
Yes Very high
Neoliberal
resilience
Vulnerable
individuals,
communities
and states
(discrete)/the
neoliberal
system
(systemic)
Western governments/
international
institutions,
including
the World Bank
and UNEP
Asafu-Adjaye et al.
(2015); United Nations
Environment Programme
(2014); World Bank
(2013); World Resources
Institute (2008)
Partly High
Social
resilience
Communities
(discrete)
Activists, communities,
some development/
environment NGOs,
academics
Oxfam (2009, 2012);
United Nations Secretary
General’s High-level
Panel on Global
Sustainability (2012);
Hopkins (2008)
Yes Moderate/
low
Ecological
resilience
Ecosystems
(systemic)
Activists, academics/
scientists, IPCC,
some inter/
nongovernment
organizations
Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change
(2012); Rockström et al.
(2009b); Rockström
et al. (2009a)
Yes Very low
Table continues on facing page
Level of Attention/
Institutionalization Nodal Points Governance Form
Governance
Rationality
Transitional
Pathway
Very high National security,
existential threats, critical
infrastructure, whole of
government
Hierarchical, with
some information
networks
Administrative Technocratic
ecomodernist
Very low Climate-resilient
development, individual/
developing state
responsibility, risk
management
Markets, networks
based on economic
relations, financialization
of ecological risks
Economic Market
ecomodernist
Very low Human security, capacity
building, vulnerability,
resource dependency,
transformation
Networks based on
citizen participation
Deliberative Postgrowth/post
development
Low Ecological/Anthropocene/
posthuman security,
vulnerability, Earth
system governance,
planetary boundaries,
transformation
Networks based on
citizen participation/
hierarchical global
governance
Deliberative/
administrative
Postgrowth/Post
development
Table 1
Resilience Discourses in the Climate Security Debate (Continued from facing page)
climate change, peak oil, and other resource constraints (Hopkins 2008; Welsh
2014), while the voluntary simplicity and degrowth movements have outlined
resilience strategies to reduce dependencies on high levels of consumption
(Alexander 2012; Kallis 2011).
However, with the exception of the UN documents, social resilience texts
lack formal authority and have attracted only a very low level of attention be-
yond the academy. Nonetheless, this material is highly relevant, as it articulates
a clear and unique resilience discourse in which communities are the primary
referents. Social resilience promotes participatory network forms of governance
shaped by deliberative rationality and articulates nodal points such as “vul-
nerability,” “human security,” “capacity building,” “resource dependency,” and
“transformation.” It envisages a postgrowth/postdevelopment transitional path-
way that is skeptical of the capacity for technological innovation alone to solve
social and environmental problems and instead prioritizes a comprehensive re-
evaluation of neoliberal economic and development objectives. As such, the
fundamental purpose of social resilience is to alleviate human vulnerability
through systemic transformation to build the capacity of communities to pro-
vide their own security by reducing dependencies on resource extraction, tech-
nological fixes, and transnational market structures.
Ecological Resilience
The biotic correlate of human security is ecological security, necessitating the
“creation of a condition where the physical surroundings of a community pro-
vide for the needs of its inhabitants without diminishing its natural stock”
(Rogers 1997, 30). A standard conceptualization of ecological security seeks
to prevent disruption to vital equilibriums, such as those between human pop-
ulations and the natural resource base, and between different human popula-
tions (Pirages 2005). However, as McDonald (2018, 166; see also Fagan 2017)
points out, “notions of ‘balance’ and ‘equilibria’ sit uneasily with the contem-
porary realities of environmental change…, [because] they imply the possibility
of a return to a previous (geological) era, while … downplaying the enormity of
change and the role of human[s] in creating that change.” A more defensible
basis of ecological security, therefore, is not maintaining the “stability of individ-
ual parts within a system, but rather the system’s capacity to spontaneously
reorganise itself in response to disturbance and adapt in ways that preserve its
identity and function” (Grove and Chandler 2017, 81). For this reason, McDonald
(2018, 166) contends that “ecological security should be oriented less towards
the preservation of balance and more towards ecosystem resilience.” Similar argu-
ments are made by proponents of “Anthropocene security” (Fagan 2017;
Harrington and Shearing 2017) and “posthuman” security (Eroukhmanoff and
Harker 2017; Mitchell 2016).
Shifting the objective of security from merely stabilizing systems to enhanc-
ing ecosystem resilience also necessitates a capacity for system transformation. This
118 • Discourses of Resilience in the Climate Security Debate
is reflected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC; 2012, 563)
definition of resilience as the “ability of a system and its component parts to
anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event
in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation,
restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions.”
Ecological resilience departs from social resilience by adopting a systemic
referent (ecosystems) rather than a discrete referent (communities). While this
systemic referent is clearly articulated by key securitizing actors such as the IPCC
and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (see, e.g., 2019), these entities possess only a
low level of formal authority. With the exception of the periodic IPCC assessment
reports, they have also attracted only a low level of attention outside of academia.
Some articulations support participatory network forms of governance shaped by
a deliberative rationality, while others favor the more administrative/hierarchical
approaches implied by notions of “Earth system governance” (Hardt 2018).
Other key nodal points include “ecosystem vulnerability,” “ecological security,”
“planetary boundaries,” and “transformation.”
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ecological resilience also challenges
both strategic and neoliberal security frameworks by demonstrating the necessity
for collective action, adaptive learning, and deliberative decision-making to meet
climate security threats, and the need to build redundancy and diversity into
social–ecological systems, and above all, by recognizing the incontrovertible
interdependencies between social and ecological systems and the limits to con-
tinued economic growth. This underscores the potential for ecological resilience
discourses to subvert neoliberal strictures. As Corry (2014, 264) puts it, “while
central planning is absolutely compatible with neoliberal governmentality …,
the kind of planning justified through reference to resilience is not, precisely
because it limits market logics and exposes the state apparatus to critique and dis-
turbance.” For instance, although the Stockholm Resilience Centre has been accused
by some of being a conduit of neoliberal resilience (see, e.g., Duffield 2011), it ac-
tually resists neoliberal nostrums bymaintaining that global economic activity must
remain within a set of finite “planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al. 2009b;
Stockholm Resilience Centre 2019). In contrast to neoliberalism’s avid eco-
modernism, this postgrowth perspective prescribes the demarketization of many
social and ecological functions and significant state intervention to secure a “safe
operating space for humanity” (Rockström et al. 2009a).
Conclusions
As I have shown in this article, to understand resilience merely, or even primar-
ily, as an extension of neoliberal governmentality is not only analytically over-
determined but also excessively totalizing, because it obscures the socially and
ecologically progressive transformational capacity of the discourse (Anderson
2015; Grove and Chandler 2017). I demonstrated this by comparing the four
main discourses of resilience in the climate security debate on the basis of their
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respective referent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points, forms and rational-
ities of governance, and prescribed social–ecological–technological transitional
pathways. I also evaluated each discourse as to the clarity of its referent object/s,
level of formal authority, and degree of institutionalization. These findings are
summarized in Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, strategic resilience fits reasonably comfortably
within traditional national security frameworks and constitutes a pragmatic response
to new security challenges within existing forms and rationalities of governance.
Emanating from the highest levels of the state and achieving a very high degree
of institutionalization, strategic resilience articulates a clear and discrete referent
object—the nation-state—which is to be protected from climatic risks by means
of hierarchical, administrative, technocratic, ecomodernist resilience measures.
Neoliberal resilience shifts the emphasis from national security to preserv-
ing the neoliberal socioeconomic system, although this more systemic referent
is routinely discursively obscured. As resilience is to be enhanced by inculcating
vulnerable states and their citizens to mitigate their vulnerability through par-
ticipation in market processes, neoliberal resilience adopts a market rationality
and an ecomodernist social–ecological–technological transitional pathway.
However, despite possessing the formal authority of leading multilateral orga-
nizations, neoliberal resilience has not attained anywhere near the same degree
of institutionalization as strategic resilience. Nor does it address fundamental
causes of vulnerability, and in many respects, it actually exacerbates these by
increasing the exposure of vulnerable populations and ecosystems to the vicis-
situdes of global markets.
Social resilience supports a human security framework that transcends tra-
ditional state security strictures and enhances the capacity of communities to
alleviate the risks they face through participatory and deliberative forms of gov-
ernance. By taking communities as its discrete referent, social resilience is
attuned to both the systemic production of vulnerability and the need for sys-
tem transformation in a postgrowth/postdevelopment direction. However, de-
spite clearly articulating all of these elements, social resilience discourse has
only achieved a moderate to low level of formal authority and a very low level
of institutionalization.
Ecological resilience shifts the referent object from communities to ecosys-
tems to enhance the Earth system’s capacity to spontaneously reorganize itself in
response to disturbance. This requires containing socioeconomic activity within
finite planetary boundaries, necessitating a postgrowth/postdevelopment tran-
sitional pathway. Ecological resilience’s systemic referent is clearly articulated,
albeit from a very low position of formal authority. Nonetheless, largely because
of the governmental and media attention given to the IPCC assessment reports,
ecological resilience has achieved a slightly higher level of institutionalization than
both neoliberal and social resilience. In some articulations, ecological resilience
prescribes participatory/deliberative forms of governance, while in others, more
hierarchical/administrative notions of Earth system governance are proposed.
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Of course, in reality, discourses are more fluid and hybrid than the some-
what rigid categories I have developed in this article. However, this typology
does capture the broad range of articulations of resilience across the climate se-
curity field, thereby clarifying the various ways in which climate security actors
understand threats, risks, and vulnerability; how these factors are both exacer-
bated and mitigated; and who bears responsibility for causing and alleviating
climate insecurities. In doing so, a deeper understanding of how dominant
climate security narratives shape contemporary global environmental politics
has been made possible.
Nonetheless, questions remain as to the capacity of resilience to shape ef-
ficacious human and ecological security strategies, because, even in their social
and ecological articulations, most resilience discourses fail to articulate exactly
for whom resilience is sought and how this is to be achieved in practice (Boas
and Rothe 2016; Brown 2013; Zebrowski 2016). Answering these crucial ques-
tions, therefore, requires an examination of the ways that “actually existing
resilience” practices have shaped climate security outcomes for the world’s most
vulnerable communities and ecosystems, and how these might be improved to
reduce fundamental vulnerabilities. This might involve ethnographic observa-
tion of, and in-depth interviews with, resilience practitioners and members of
those communities in which resilience measures have been implemented. Sub-
jecting resilience programs to systematic policy evaluations and the development
of metrics to measure different kinds of resilience would also increase the like-
lihood that climate security strategies actually address fundamental insecurities
and vulnerabilities.
Peter Ferguson is a lecturer in politics at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.
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Appendix
Level of Attention/Institutionalization of Each Discourse
Resilience
Discourse Key Literature
Factiva Citations,
2007–2017
Level of Attentiona
Document Discourse
Strategic
resilience
US Department of Defense (2012) 7 Very low Very high
US Department of Defense (2014a) 97 Very low
US Department of Defense (2014b) 1135 Very high
US Department of Homeland Security (2007) 152 Low
Obama (2010) 5149 Very high
Obama (2013) 28 Very low
Obama (2015) 3172 Very high
CNA Corporation (2014) 25 Very low
Strategic Trends Programme (2014) 24 Very low
UK Ministry of Defence (2008) 2 Very low
UK Ministry of Defence (2010) 19 Very low
UK Ministry of Defence (2015) 151 Low
German Advisory Council on Global Change (2007) 7 Very low
Neoliberal
resilience
Asafu-Adjaye et al. (2015) 22 Very low Very low
United Nations Environment Programme (2014) 18 Very low
World Bank (2013) 39 Very low
World Resources Institute (2008) 2 Very low
Social
resilience
Oxfam (2009) 1 Very low Very low
Oxfam (2012) 0 Very low
United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel
on Global Sustainability (2012)
98 Very low
Hopkins (2008) 79 Very low
Ecological
resilience
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012) 228 Moderate Low
Rockström et al. (2009a) 116 Low
Rockström et al. (2009b) 9 Very low
aVery low ≤ 99; low = 100–199; moderate = 200–299; high = 300–399; very high ≥ 400.
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